1980-1996 across the continent as a whole. The sources from which the table was compiled report that banking problems were experienced in 50 of the continent's 56 countries. Many of these problems proved long-lasting and 10 countries experienced additional rounds of banking weakness. Figure 2 shows that the number of countries experiencing banking distress has trended upward over time. Figure 3 plots a frequency distribution for the duration of banking distress in individual countries. Table 2 partly updates Table 1 . It summarizes information gleaned from interviews with informed sources and information on major banking failures reported since 1995 on the Lexis-Nexis database for five selected sub-Saharan countries: Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Lexis-Nexis descriptions of when and why a bank fails focus on directly observable triggering events, such as unserviceable customer runs and proveable violations of banking statutes. However, it is superficial to say that a bank fails either because it runs out of liquidity or because its managers are discovered to have broken some law. A bank seldom fails unless it first becomes insolvent and insolvent banks often play fast and loose with their legal obligations.
Understanding the phenomena of bank runs and bank closures begins with understanding three points: what it means for a bank to become insolvent, what incentives govern how bankers, regulators, and auditors respond to insolvency, and the ways in which adverse information that insiders have about a bank's unbooked losses spreads across its customer base. A bank becomes insolvent when without outside aid the discounted present value of its assets can no longer cover the present * The authors are respectively James F. Cleary Professor in Finance and Doctoral Candidate in Finance at Boston College. The paper has benefitted from the research assistance of Tolga Tobaςi and criticisms from Tonji Sobodu. The analysis draws heavily on ideas first presented in Kane (1998a and b) . This work was started while Tara Rice was a visiting financial economist at the Office of the value of the obligations it has incurred on and off its balance sheet. A bank is liquid as long as it can cover whatever part of its obligations is currently falling due. A bank that can prove its solvency can always raise liquid funds from outside sources. Even when a bank is mildly insolvent, it can usually raise liquid funds by selling off its good assets or pledging them as collateral for loans.
It is seldom in the bureaucratic or personal interests of bank supervisors to fail an insolvent bank unless and until it experiences palpable liquidity problems. In practice, by the time an insolvent bank becomes illiquid enough to force government intervention, its net worth consists almost entirely of taxpayer risk capital supplied in the form of explicit or implicit government guarantees. Such a bank may be instructively described as a "zombie" institution.
A zombie bank is an insolvent institution whose existence has been unnaturally prolonged by managerial and supervisory efforts to rely on accounting sleight of hand to cover up the depth of its accrued losses and by offering the black magic of formal and informal government guarantees to depositors and other creditors. Depositors seldom run a bank when it first becomes a zombie. This is because zombie institutions can issue deposits that trade on the basis of the credit standing of their chartering government. The result is that a run seldom occurs until depositors begin to doubt that the government can mobilize enough funds to give the bank the support it needs to keep its repayment prospects credible.
This incentive structure implies that the probability that a country's banking system will experience widespread distress increases not so much with the depth and breadth of individual banking insolvencies as with perceptions of fiscal weakness and corruptibility in its government. The weaker a government appears on these fiscal and ethical dimensions, the lower the level of depositor trust and the more easily banking distress can trigger an intervention-forcing customer run. Similarly, the fewer fiscal and ethical resources a government possesses, the more difficult it is for officials to negotiate a workable plan for setting a distressed banking system permanently back on its feet I. Bank Insolvencies, Banking Subsidies, and Silent Runs
What journalists perceive as a banking crisis is typically a public surfacing of very bad news about the value of a nation's banking assets. This news signals the Controller of the Currency (OCC), summer 1998. Some data have been obtained from the OCC using the FitchIBCA Bankscope database. need to restructure a country's banking markets to effect the exit, outside takeover, or recapitalization of a multitude of severely damaged local banks. In a crisis, taxpayers are exposed to loss from the damaged banks and would benefit from changes in the country's regulatory strategy. The changes needed are more extensive, the deeper and broader are the losses that regulators have allowed to accumulate in the zombie banks.
As noted earlier, a zombie bank is a bank whose earning assets cannot generate enough income to pay the principal and interest due on its debts. Often a zombie's most worrisome losses do not show on its accounting statements. A zombie's survival depends not on the bank's own profitability, but on the government's ability to pass responsibility to taxpayers for the opportunity-cost value of the bank's accumulated losses.
As long as taxpayers cannot or do not resist this passthrough, a country's banking industry can (as in China) tolerate a deep and broad degree of insolvency without undergoing open crisis. Open crisis can be avoided as long as the particular government has the power to transfer responsibility for covering bank losses implicitly onto the balance sheets of its taxpayers. In China, government policies are ruthlessly enforced. Amnesty International reports that 1867 executions took place in 1997, many for noncapital crimes such as falsifying tax receipts. The memory of Tiananmen Square makes it all the more unlikely that Chinese taxpayers will resist paying their share of the costs generated by government banking policy.
The metaphor of an institutional "zombie" is an instructive one. It communicates two useful insights about the distorted incentives that prevail in a bank whose operations as a stand-alone enterprise can no longer create any capitalized net earnings. First, like the zombies featured in horror movies, an insolvent bank enjoys an artificial life-in-death existence. To prevent its creditors from putting it into the grave, it must be able to pacify these creditors either by disinformational accounting or by invoking the "black magic" of government guarantees. Once a bank is recognized to be a zombie, its customers understand that it is unreasonable to expect it to pay its own bills anymore. Customers focus their worries, less on the prospective profitability of the bank, and more on whether government officials can make good their implicit and explicit promises to protect depositors from loss.
Second, the zombie metaphor clarifies the fundamental nastiness of the crisisresolution problem that the chartering government faces. Anyone who has seen even a few horror movies has been taught that zombies -as soul-less living-dead entities-are drawn to horrifically evil practices. Zombie banks are similarly attracted to horrifically unfair and inefficient funding and lending strategies. In pursuing these strategies, a zombie damages a country's capital stock by supporting longshot patterns of real investment and "zombifies" its competitors by undermining industry profit margins. These twin events occur because prudently conservative portfolio strategies cannot be counted upon to generate enough earnings to restore the net worth of a deeply insolvent bank. To restore the firm's health, the manager of a zombie needs a series of big wins. Desperate to sustain its business, a zombie will gladly pay unsustainably high interest rates for deposits and will gladly accept unsustainably low contract interest rates on extremely high-risk loans and investments. As the chorus of a Harry Belafonte calypso song observes, Zombies "don't give a damn; they done dead already." It is reasonable for the managers of a zombie institution to favor highly speculative and highly leveraged loans that a wellcapitalized bank would reject. High contract interest income can be accrued on these risky new loans until they fall formally into arrears. These accounting earnings help to conceal losses on old loans. In the unlikely case where the bulk of the high-risk loans a zombie makes are repaid, the strategy pays off, and the zombie can resume a natural life.
Most countries find themselves confronted with a zombified banking system at one time or another. This is because three strategic elements characterize the banking policies of almost every country in the world, including the United States.
First, the policy framework either requires or induces domestic banks to make credit available to governmentally designated classes of borrowers at a subsidized interest rate. Concessionary interest rates amount to politically directed (and often at least partly corrupt) subsidies that are routed through the banking system to governmentfavored bank borrowers. 1 Second, the policy framework commits government officials to provide either explicitly or conjecturally a series of repayment guarantees to bank creditors.
Because the price the government makes the banks pay for these guarantees is seldom commensurate with the risks the banks pursue, the guarantee systems ends up generating government subsidies to bank risk-taking. The more portfolio and operational risks a bank can take on, the greater its aggregate subsidy becomes.
Third, taxpayers fail to erect institutional arrangements designed to effectively monitor and control the linked subsidies. The contracting and reporting framework under which government regulatory officials work does not make them directly accountable for measuring and controlling the size of either subsidy.
In the long run, the globalization of banking and regulatory markets has the good effect of disciplining host-country efforts to exploit its taxpayers by this kind of two-part subsidy scheme. Foreign-bank entry intensifies the competitive pressure authorities face from alternative regulatory systems. The increasing availability of offshore deposits and deposit substitutes lowers the cost to host-country corporations and wealthy households of avoiding the burdens that local banks and regulators would otherwise impose on them. They can escape these burdens by engaging in a "silent run" on their local zombie banks. A run is itself a vivid (if tasteless) metaphor for an uncontrolled loss of depositor funds. A silent run is a run on a government-supported banking system in which the funds being lost are large-denomination deposits that belong to relatively well-informed parties. Particularly in a developing country, a silent run may simultaneously manifest itself along a second policy dimension as a speculative attack on the government-controlled exchange rate. Silent runs have shown this dual effect in Asia during the last two years.
The Six Stages of Financial Crisis Table 3 partitions financial crises into six stages. In the first stage, banks develop opportunity losses from government-influenced lending that renders them insolvent and makes their survival depend entirely on the support of government guarantees. In the second stage, silent runs occur as doubts surface about the continued workability of the government's contradictory credit-allocation and guarantee schemes. These silent runs curtail possibilities for new fundraising by insolvent zombie banks and lessen the incremental risk-taking zombie institutions can book.
At the beginning of a silent run in a developing country, the departure of large balances is often financed by an infusion of foreign-bank debt. As foreign banks' position in zombie banks expands, they eventually see the need to cut off the flow of new credit to zombie banks and to protect themselves against a fall in the exchange rate. This brings the insolvency of domestic banks out into the open. With access to credit blocked and with foreign banks speculating against the exchange rate, zombie banks and the government are forced to revise their portfolio and policy strategies.
It is instructive to think of a silent run as a harbinger of open crisis. Once a government's guarantees begin to look unsustainable, a zombie's savviest depositors are going to insist either on being offered good collateral or on receiving a discriminatorily higher interest rate than the bank quotes to its less-informed customers. If savvy depositors are denied the credit enhancements and higher interest rates they require, they will move much of their balances out of the bank. Such losses of deposits must be financed. It is dangerous for a zombie bank to finance a substantial deposit outflow from asset sales because selling troubled assets for less than their book value would register losses on the bank's accounting statements.
Such transactions would make the bank's insolvency easier for less savvy customers to appreciate. To buy time, zombies usually seek high-denomination foreign funds via either interbank borrowing, brokered deposits or collateralized debt. In advance of the emergence of palpable crisis, distressed zombie banks in Asia experienced a silent run and an influx of foreign bank debt (Kane, 1998a) .
A useful metaphor for the loss-generation stage that culminates in a silent run is that of an underground fire. At some point, such a fire burns its way to the surface and government officials have to fight its spread. Although few people have the ability to sense a bank's opportunity losses until they surface, the losses nevertheless simmer in banks' economic balance sheets and grow more intense by the day.
The difference between a second-stage silent run and a third-stage open run resembles the difference between a guerrilla attack on a fort by a few proficient snipers and an all-out assault by a nation's entire citizenry. A silent run is silent because it is in the interest of worried large depositors to operate quietly. However, a crowd of small depositors cannot exit quietly. Small depositors get in one another's way and make an awful lot of noise when they try to leave en masse.
During the early stages of a silent run, many large-denomination domestic deposits either become secured or move themselves off the books of local banks. For awhile, net deposit outflows can be offset by a mixture of foreign deposits and loans from foreign and local banking competitors. But because this substitute funding comes from increasingly informed creditors on progressively more onerous terms, it transmits adverse information about the bank to its less-informed customers. Paying these tougher terms squeezes bank profit margins and helps to generate poor accounting performance, which feeds rumors of systemic insolvency. As these rumors reach the ears of less-sophisticated domestic depositors, a country's run becomes progressively less silent.
Summarizing the argument, a wave of weakness in a national banking system differs markedly from independent instances of weakness in its individual banks.
Waves of systemic weakness have similar roots in developed and developing countries. Losses that have common political roots can and will almost always be covered up temporarily with the connivance of government regulators.
Unbooked losses are created whenever a government's credit-allocation preferences are imposed on a country's banks. These preferences do not cause liquidity problems until two things become clear: first, that the incremental capital stock financed by subsidized loans cannot generate an adequate flow of loan repayments to validate the book value of the debt, and, second, that the government's guarantee arrangements may no longer be strong enough to fill in the gap in the banks' discounted flow of future earnings.
When Loans Go Bad
The opportunity costs to taxpayers of government credit-allocation schemes are routinely covered up when historical-cost accounting methods are used to book subsidized loans at par. In principle, just as when a banker accepts a fraudulent loan, every time a bank books a politically preferred loan at face value, its managers are concealing an opportunity loss. The loss comes from accepting an instrument whose expected rate of return falls short of the yield needed to compensate the bank fully for the default risk the asset entails.
From an opportunity-cost perspective, auditors and bank supervisors use deceptive criteria for what it means for a loan to go bad. By these criteria, a loan is good until it falls greatly into arrears. Accountants classify loans that remain in arrears for several months as "nonperforming loans" (NPL). Until delays in loan service reach the NPL threshold, interest income is accrued as scheduled even if the bank has not received the payments due. When a loan is classified as NPL, accruals are reversed and subsequent payments are posted only as received. The need to reverse past accruals make zombie banks eager to use counterfeit ways to make loan service appear current.
Comprehensive data on the level of nonperforming loans at African banks do not exist. Figure 4 displays the scattershot yearend information available on the FitchIBCA database for forty Kenyan banks for 1995 Kenyan banks for , 1996 Kenyan banks for , and 1997 . On average, less than half of the banks report NPL in any year and only seven banks report NPL in all three years. Moreover, informed sources assure us that, even at the banks that have chosen to supply NPL data to the IBCA, the true value of NPL is often a large multiple of the reported figure. To an economist, a bad loan or investment is one whose opportunity cost (i.e., fair market value) lies below its book value. The greater the difference between a loan's market value and book value, the worse the loan is. The worse any bank's loans are, the more the book value of that bank's net worth overstates the economic value of ownership claims to the bank's future earnings.
Troubled banks have an incentive to report good news promptly. Because authorities do not insist that opportunity losses be recognized equally promptly in bank accounting statements, they routinely permit troubled banks to overstate their net worth positions. Accepting such overstatements makes a hash of regulatory capital "requirements." Treating overstated capital as genuine net worth is a subtle form of capital forbearance by regulators. In the short run, the forbearance that each unbooked loss facilitates is hidden by uninformative valuation principles. Globalization of deposit markets makes it less costly for large corporations and wealthy families to trigger silent runs on zombie banks. The process imposes sustainable market discipline on the social cost of unfair and inefficient banking policies. By occurring earlier in the game, the silent runs of the 1980s and 1990s have stopped the politically dictated loss-shifting process implied by redistributive banking policies in Africa more promptly than silent runs could when offshore banking and investment opportunities were more difficult for African citizens to access.
Whether the speed-up is a good or a bad thing for particular sectors of particular economies depends upon how narrowly that sector's welfare turns on shortrun results. Societal benefits from creative destruction in banking are long run in nature. The desirability to incumbent politicians of installing adequate regulatory reforms decreases with the corruptibility of the government and with the brevity of its decision-making horizon. Because incumbent regulators in most countries have short terms in office, they ordinarily prefer to stave off open crisis rather than to suffer the reputational damage and political opposition entailed in conscientiously seeking to resolve silent runs once and for all. To improve the incentive structure facing the government officials assigned the tasks of regulating and supervising banks, society needs to explore ways of public-service contracting -such as creating a fund of forfeitable deferred compensation--that could lengthen top officials' decisionmaking horizon. As things stand today, incumbent officials in developing countries are attracted to dysfunctional policy strategies that keep their banks limping along in the short run by actions that increase the depth and likelihood of subsequent banking
breakdowns.
An Hegelian Perspective on Crisis-Causing Policies
Until sometime in the 1980s, the prototypical African economy was tightly controlled. Its financial sector was concentrated and highly bank-dependent, with little effective competition for loans or deposits. Financial institutions were often state-owned. These banks were inefficient, overstaffed, and not run by valuemaximizing principles. Even where banks were privately owned, management and internal controls were weak. Households tended to rely on currency to make transactions. Fiscal and monetary policies were loose. Inflation was high and exchange rates tended to be overvalued. Financial crises were frequent and longlasting.
Crisis-causing policies may be characterized as establishing an unsustainable policy mix. Table 4 models in Hegelian fashion an economy's transition into financial crisis. It portrays crisis as a delayed reaction to interacting dialectical processes. In most developing countries, a dialectic in banking policies interacts with a dialectic in macro policies. Each dialectic features an unsustainable conflict between the contradictory effects of its particular policy stance. The conflicting elements may be envisaged as a Hegelian thesis and antithesis, whose repeated collision is bound eventually to evolve into a new policy synthesis. In turn, whatever new policy mix is synthesized, it is bound to generate contradictory effects that fuel a successor dialectic.
We have already reviewed the opposing forces that constitute the central dialectic in banking policies. We pose the government's promotion of a loss-causing credit allocation scheme as an Hegelian thesis. Such a scheme induces a country's banks to place "value-sabotaged" loans on their books. We describe governmentdirected lending as value-sabotaged, because each loan that is booked is worth less in present value than the principal being lent out. In booking these loans at face value, a bank accepts a contract interest rate that its managers know to lie appreciably below the interest rate the contract deserves to carry. The capitalized value of this unbooked wedge of uncollectable interest is lost at the very moment the loan is made. The effect of the sabotage is to lessen the true value of the cushion provided to creditors by the bank's equity capital. The resulting hidden increase in the bank's leverage shifts risk to its creditors and increases the value to the creditors of whatever government guarantees are attached to bank liabilities. The increasing value of government guarantees that government-directed credit allocation entails is the antithesis. Not immediately, but eventually, opposition exerted by the antithesis renders the thesis unsustainable. Other things equal, the value of government guarantees increases faster and the breakdown occurs sooner, the more quickly a country's banking system loads up on the subsidized/sabotaged credits.
Whether or not explicit deposit insurance exists in a particular country, the dialectical conflict between government lending priorities and the unbooked cost of supporting government guarantees of bank debt is easier to conceal at a state-owned bank than at a private institution. In practice, depositors at a state-owned bank feel less vulnerable to loss. They expect taxpayers to be made responsible virtually without limit for whatever debts the bank owes. For given taxpayer exposure (T), a state-owned zombie bank can usually stave off a silent run longer than a similarly situated private bank could.
The interacting macro dialectic pits the thesis of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies against the antithesis of a relatively fixed exchange rate. To pose a contradiction, the government's exchange-rate target need not be absolutely fixed. As long as the local currency's value is forced to fluctuate within a narrow band, the macroeconomic imbalance will eventually move the currency's price to the bottom of the band.
The macro dialectic and the banking dialectic clearly influence each other.
Monetary expansion, fiscal deficits, and credit-allocation policies jointly undermine the sustainability of government guarantees; inefficient patterns of investment ultimately destroy wealth and reduce export capacity.
For every poisonous policy mix, a slow-working antidote is provided by market discipline. The expected profits that knowledgeable parties can earn from testing the government's ability to fulfill its promises to support the exchange rate and to support the banking system increase as the opportunity cost of these promises becomes larger and larger.
In a pure currency crisis, market testing takes the form of a bear raid. In these raids, sometimes, the bears are devoured, and sometimes the bears dine heartily on IMF credits and the government's foreign-exchange reserves. In a pure banking crisis, the test is a silent run, whose features we have already summarized. A government that shores up its guarantee system can adjust its banking policies to stop or reverse a silent run before it erupts into open crisis. However, in dealing with an emerging banking crisis, most governments look initially to increase the liquidity of their banking systems without cleaning up more than a small fraction of the banking system's accrued losses. IMF lending helps to reinforce this myopic tendency (Calomiris, 1998) . IMF lending dictates a new macro policy mix, one that stabilizes the recipient country's exchange rate at the expense of the population's hoped-for improvements in their standard of living. The reduced standard of living increases bank insolvency by reducing the ability of the average borrower to service its debts, while the flow of outside financing that the IMF provides prolongs the investmentdistorting survival of zombie banks. IMF lending does this by encouraging authorities to gamble that the zombies can grow out of their insolvency and by increasing the credibility of the recipient government's promises to protect bank depositors. This incomplete package of financial and macroeconomic reforms redistributes future income in ways that are bound to generate popular discontent. As discontent turns to open unrest, the government's commitment to fiscal and monetary restraint is undermined and the possibility emerges of physical attacks on bank and government buildings and personnel. At best, IMF loans temporarily push the crisis in banking policy back underground. But when banking reform is neglected, after a brief respite recipient countries experience a new round of bear raids and silent runs.
In the synthetic third stage of any dialectic, some (not necessarily all) of the original contradictions between each policy thesis and its antithesis are resolved. A lasting policy synthesis seldom occurs until the cumulative social cost of complying with IMF restrictions and fighting bear raids and open runs forces authorities reluctantly to confront the need to improve incentives in the banking system. In a banking crisis, the synthesis must make authorities' ability to shift the losses to taxpayers credible again. This can be done temporarily by drawing on external aid (e.g., via collateralized loans from the IMF or structural adjustment credits from World Bank) or internally by redirecting governmental funds to strengthen the guarantees. But unless the insolvency of zombie banks is corrected, the banking policy mix will continue to distort bank lending and real-investment incentives toward imprudently high-risk alternatives.
A news item that surfaced in March 1998 can serve as a parable for the dialectical process we have tried to describe. Few bankers and government officials know much about plant or animal husbandry. But science has established that, given the opportunity, many creatures will mindlessly absorb nutrients until they die from overabsorption. Anyone who has ever visited a modern dairy farm knows that the feeding and milking of cows has been completely automated. Cows walk onto stainless-steel turntables to be milked, and they are released afterwards back to their stalls to eat. Food is mixed and piped to their stalls in carefully timed doses. The news item in question reported events at an Olympia, Washington dairy farm that occurred when one of the cows shook loose the control mechanism on an automatic feeding machine. As tons of grain spilled onto the barn floor, a feeding frenzy ensued. When it was over, 32 Holsteins and Jerseys had gorged themselves to death.
The reporting of the story closed with a quote from a veterinarian, who explained that a cow will eat grain until it dies; it just don't know any better.
This incident brings to life the theory of how subsidies to risk-bearing destroy a bank's net worth. Most banks respond to subsidies to risk-taking by booking as much of the subsidized risks as they can. Eventually, these underdiversified risk exposures encounter a run of adversity strong enough to kill the bank's net worth.
Well-diversified bank stockholders can approve of such potentially ruinous gambles, because they need not leave their share of the risk exposure undiversified in order to capture their share of the subsidy. Bank stockholders can neutralize the risk to their own net worth by arbitraging their share of each subsidized risk exposure by initiating clever trades in other instruments.
Role of Foreign Institutions
Most developed countries are willing to allow their domestic banks to book a wider range of risks in foreign subsidiaries than they are prepared to tolerate in homecountry offices. This is because relationships with internationally active customers are a geographically footloose part of the banking business and because politicians don't expect to confront responsibility for foreign banking losses in domestic political arenas. This creates incentives for banks to "overlend" in foreign markets. Second, barriers to the entry of foreign financial firms into local banking markets customarily exist, but in recent years officials both in developed regions and in many developing countries have been persuaded --by technological change and appropriate side payments--to relax these barriers (Claessens, Demirguç-Kunt, and Huizenga, 1996) .
Whenever a country's banks approach a fatal level of insolvency, market discipline is exerted on its two-part subsidy scheme by lower-cost or higher-quality offshore suppliers of regulatory and guarantee services. As the global market for guarantee services seeps into more and more countries, the market power of both host-country banks and host-country regulators declines. Entry by outside competitors takes place through capital inflows, but in countries where zombies exist subsequent activity by foreign institutions on behalf of their domestic customers may be expected to entail even larger capital outflows. When such outflows ensue, capital controls can relieve exchange-rate pressure in the short run, but over time inventive contracting technologies are bound to reduce greatly the effectiveness of capital controls. In the long run, political pressure to stop the outflow of domestic wealth forces domestic banking policy in developing countries to adopt regulatory schemes whose features more closely resemble those of the world's best-practice countries.
A sequence of market structure adjustments is implied. The more corruptible a country's government, the easier it is for foreign banks to buy entry privileges.
Officials in the host government can smooth the distributive politics of the initial entry by emphasizing the basic fairness of allowing a foreign bank to follow its longstanding home-country customers into a venue in which the bank's customers are helping the host government to expand domestic income and employment. From such a foothold, a clever foreign bank can gradually expand its range of business. This gradual expansion in product offerings puts downward pressure on the interest rate spreads that host-country banks can earn. This pressure is felt most keenly when cyclical weakness in domestic loan repayments aggravates macroeconomic stresses on an already-zombified system of host-country banks. In this case, host-country banks can rapidly lose domestic market share. The intensity of the pressure that can be exerted on domestic market shares grows over time with global advances in information and contracting technology. Pressure also increases with the size of the gap which exists between the efficiency and fairness of the host-country regulatory scheme and the schemes under which the foreign-bank entrants operate. Reduced profit margins and increased cyclical stress leave inefficient domestic banks increasingly unable to project credible future profits. Questions about the sustainability of implicit government support for insolvent zombie institutions grow and trigger silent runs that eventually evolve into crisis-revealing open runs. The political difficulty of explicitly recapitalizing the nation's zombie institutions with explicit taxes creates opportunities for foreign banks to help the host government to improve customer confidence and to recapitalize the system by taking insolvent banking franchises off the government's hands.
How to Break the Cycle of Misregulation
Inevitably, supervisory standards and incentives are country-specific and politically compromised. Taxpayers and unsophisticated depositors would be better able to protect themselves if banks and regulators adopted information systems for measuring risk capital and risk exposure that were markedly more transparent to outside parties. Taxpayers would also be helped if regulatory response systems would seek to mimic market disciplines and to import monitoring technology from countries with demonstrably better rules and enforcement systems.
It is dangerous for taxpayers to count on cross-country negotiations and regulatory cooperation to control the agency costs that arise in bank regulation.
Multinational standards and protocols are inevitably negotiated by a cross-country panel of regulators whose own individual incentive structures are distorted. At least some members of any panel will be determined to preserve enough informational and behavioral leeway to let them continue to mask their own access to regulatory rents.
When it comes to dealing with troubled institutions, most officials are sorely tempted to follow bureaucratic and career interests. During the course of his own career, every regulator is faced with opportunities to recycle bad loans made by "zombie" banks. The good way to recycle bad loans is to insist that stockholders or taxpayers recapitalize explicitly the banks that own these loans. It is bad recycling to leave bad loans on the books of zombie institutions at inflated values and to try to fool the public into thinking that such a policy poses a reasonable gamble for taxpayers.
One reason the world has experienced so many banking crises in recent years is that the short decisionmaking horizons of top regulators makes Bad Recycling offer officials better reputational and career payoffs than Good Recycling does. In a typical crisis, taxpayer losses aggregate to between 1 and 10 percent of GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996a) . The level of unbooked losses that depositors will allow a nation's banks to accumulate is restrained both by the reliability of the nation's information environment and by the credibility of government efforts to supervise and guarantee the faithful performance of bank contracts.
To provide a proxy for these environmental variables, Table 5 lists the value of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (TICPI) for 85 countries.
At this writing, the countries listed are the only countries for which the index has been compiled.
The TICPI is derived from a series of independent surveys of business executives. The surveys ask sample respondents to estimate on a 10-point scale the level of corruption in countries with which they have firsthand experience. A score of 10 would represent a "perfectly clean" country. A score of zero would signal the maximum imaginable incidence of kickbacks, bribery, extortion, and fraud in business and government transactions.
Because it is always difficult for a skeptical depositor to verify the reliability of bank accounting data, it is rational for depositors to monitor and react to news concerning the character and reputation of bankers and bank supervisors. The weaker the ethical and legal restraints that condition a country's business environment, the more depositors have to fear from corrupt, incompetent, or opportunistic bankers and government officials. We hypothesize that the frequency of large unbooked loan losses in a country's banking system is inversely related to the corruptibility of government procedures for enforcing the honorable performance of business contracts. The greater the perception of corruption in a country's business affairs, the more exposed depositors should feel to losses from corrupt or imprudent lending.
Other things equal, the lower the TICPI of a given country, the more vulnerable to loss bank depositors are and, therefore, the more quickly and energetically they should respond to rumors of bank weakness. This leads to the The frequent recurrence and slow resolution of banking problems in high-C countries supports both the vulnerability-mitigation and resolution-impedance hypotheses.
III. The Case for Increased Accountability
Banking environments and patterns of banking regulation vary greatly from country to country. Nevertheless, three strategic elements characterize the banking policies of almost every country in the world today:
1. Politically-Directed Subsidies to Selected Bank Borrowers: The policy framework either requires or rewards banks for making credit available to designated classes of borrowers at a subsidized interest rate; 2. Subsidies to Bank Risk-Taking: The policy framework commits government officials to providing on subsidized terms explicit or conjectural guarantees to holders of bank liabilities; 3. Defective Monitoring and Control of the Subsidies: The contracting and reporting framework for government officials fails to make them directly accountable for controlling the size of either subsidy.
Taken together, the first two elements in the strategy let banks sneakily gather wealth from taxpayers and require loan officers to divert some or all of the wealth gathered to a politically designated set of favored borrowers. The third element prevents taxpayers from monitoring the joint cost of the first two strategies and undermines efforts to discipline excess transfers in timely fashion by political action or parliamentary review. Creating an enforceable obligation for regulators to report truthfully to taxpayers and watchdog institutions about the size of the dual subsidies would make authorities accountable for explaining whether and how taxpayer benefits generated indirectly by these subsidies might be said to justify the costs being passed through to taxpayers.
Without side payments from the sectors that receive net benefits, it would be unlikely that a growing flow of subsidies could even for short periods prove incentive-compatible for top government officials. To enlist high-ranking regulators into the benefit-redistribution game, two further conditions must hold. First, taxpayers must be kept from assessing by indirect means the magnitude of the costs they face in funding the subsidies. Second, regulators themselves must be able to extract suitably laundered incentive compensation from banks and borrowers.
Moreover, the compensation offered must be sufficient to balance the risk of damage to the reputations of policymakers and the regulatory bureaus they head if, during their watch on the bridge, the system for covertly financing the subsidy were to break down.
Contradictory policy regimes may be portrayed as accidents waiting to happen. A banking crisis occurs when a sufficient amount of bad luck hits a banking system whose managers have made their institutions vulnerable to this amount and type of bad luck. Formally, the possibility of a bureaucratic breakdown in the costshifting process may be analyzed by means of an evolutionary process that shifts between two states: continuation and breakdown. The probability of breakdown, p, evolves through time. It rises with the extent of financial weakness (G) in the system for supporting government guarantees and with the cumulative size of taxpayers' hidden responsibility for supporting unfunded guarantees of bank liabilities (T). In turn, T is an increasing function of system fragility (F) and government corruptibility (C):
(1)
The sign of the effect on p of the informativeness of the accounting principles that are in use in a given country (A) [i.e., A p ƒ ƒ ] is variable. The sign is negative when G and T are low. This is because informative accounting principles build customer confidence. However, when and as G and T become substantial, p also rises with A.
In any accounting system, unbooked losses are created for banks by the very act of making subsidized (i.e., below-market) loans. We have treated this overvaluation as sabotaging the asset and net-worth values that are recorded on conventional bank balance sheets. The damage from subsidized lending becomes harder for accountants to hide as the amount of government-directed loans looms larger and larger on bank balance sheets and as realizable cash flows become visible from the maturing submarginal investment projects from which debt service must be paid.
Sooner or later, savvy large-denomination depositors come to appreciate the unreported hole that value-sabotaged loans imbed in accounting approximations to the opportunity-cost value of their banks' enterprise-contributed net worth (NW E ). NW E represents the value that the owners could get for the bank if government deposit guarantees did not exist. As a bank's NW E approaches zero, it becomes a "zombie" institution.
Systemwide fragility F increases with the number of zombies (Z) and decreases with the aggregate size of whatever NW E they might command:
A silent run begins when large-denomination depositors begin rationally to doubt whether officials can or will continue to support the promises that have been made. The triggering condition is that the aggregate value of guarantees rises so high that taxpayer resistance may be expected to make it hard for authorities to raise the funds needed to pay the bill T(F,C) in full. A silent run generates a palpable increase in each zombie bank's funding costs. In developing countries, a zombie bank's first line of defense against a silent run is typically to arrange for loans from relatively well-informed foreign banks. Like the sophisticated depositors that zombie bankers manage to retain, foreign banks demand higher interest rates and increased collateralization for their claims. The net outflows of domestic deposits that zombie banks experience are financed by a combination of selected asset sales and high-rate new debt. In consciously deciding to finance a silent run, foreign bankers may feel confident that (as in Mexico in 1994) they can successfully lobby the IMF, their host government, and their home governments to protect them against defaults on their holdings of the debt of host-country banks. Foreign banks may also find it advantageous to speculate against the currency in offshore derivatives markets.
Even when a country's bank regulators take steps to increase the credibility of their guarantee system (e.g., by establishing a substantial line of credit with a private bank or the International Monetary Fund), the silent run on their banking system may escalate. This is because zombie banks' funding-cost increases make the fragility of the zombies' condition visible to more and more outside observers by causing a deterioration in the accounting values of income and net worth. When a zombie bank sells assets at market value, its unbooked losses on subsidized loans become a larger proportion of its footings. The more liabilities that a zombie bank rolls over at increased interest rates, the more severely its accounting and economic profits and those of its healthier competitors are squeezed.
As a silent run unfolds, reduced profit margins spread zombieness and disturbing information is revealed that improves outsiders' ability to estimate the size of T(F,C). At the same time, net regulatory burdens begin to diverge drastically between zombie and nonzombie banks. Zombie banks receive subsidies from explicit deposit insurance (where it exists) and from less-formal government guarantees that stronger banks and general taxpayers eventually help to pay for. A silent run puts pressure on regulators because it progressively undermines the willingness of taxpayers and stronger banks to tolerate the regulatory status quo. The transfer of benefits to zombies from taxpayers and viable banks becomes progressively greater the longer a silent run proceeds. Regulatory efforts to retard the exit of inefficient and insolvent deposit institutions lower the profit margins that strong banks can earn on borrowed funds and push their prospective costs for funding the government's guarantee services above the value of the guarantees that the strong institutions receive.
We used Table 3 to break the evolution of a banking crisis into six stages.
Most of the banking crises that have rolled through Latin America, Japan, Korea, the A record of rolling and incompletely resolved crises in Africa is displayed in Tables 1 and 2 . This record sounds at least three alarms. First, the frequency and geographic extent of banking crises convincingly demonstrate that numerous African banks have found it reasonable to book potentially ruinous risks. In many cases, the enterprise-contributed net worth of the banking system was entirely eliminated. Panic models are associated with Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) . In these models, ruinous declines in asset prices damage a nation's banking system when mob psychology suddenly and inexplicably turns sour. Until this crossover point is reached, banks and their borrowers experience boom times. However, even while banks are ringing up substantial profits, they are making themselves vulnerable to panic by investing in loans and securities that the irrationally optimistic psychology of the boom renders more and more severely overvalued. Banks can and do book growing profits as long as the irrational mob of savers and investors continues to overreact to favorable information about the economic prospects of bank borrowers.
Panic ensues when the bubble bursts and the mob overreacts in the opposite direction to real or imagined adverse shocks to the repayment prospects of the same customers.
Panic models of banking crises imply that what enlightened bankers and government authorities have to deal with are phenomena of the mind. Officials are told that their task is to devise a persuasive set of promises strong enough to put customer confidence back on track again. In the absence of such a comforting intervention, the economy would have to wait for the disorderly deflation of asset prices to create irresistible bargains for level-headed investors and then wait still a little longer for the profits these clever investors accrue to lead the mob back into an era of good feeling. By either route, the psychological cycle of asset-price booms and busts inevitably renews itself. Confidence is bound to overshoot as boom times render the irrational mob excessively optimistic again.
For banking regulation to succeed in the panic model, regulators must find ways to moderate the irrational swing in mob psychology. In our model, swings in consumer confidence are predominantly rational responses to changes in the flow of public information. Bad regulation is made partly responsible for the extent of overvaluation in booms and for the suddenness of corrective downward swings in asset valuation. Hiding adverse information during economic booms allows prices to rise too high, while the abrupt surfacing of hidden information leads to a rapid downward revaluation of bank net worth. The root of the asset-price bubble and of its bursting is the interaction of a popular appetite for comforting delusions with selfinterested attempts by banks and regulators to conceal adverse information from depositors and taxpayers.
Borrower efforts to lobby for government subsidies distort bank portfolio decisions. During the boom, banks are pressured into financing real-investment projects whose net present value they can easily calculate to be negative. Bankers book these overvalued loans at par and leverage the resulting loans in ways that enhance their banks' vulnerability to runs. Bankers make bad loans to assuage political pressure and they leverage their holdings of bad loans because the value of government guarantees of bank liabilities to stockholders and managers increases as a bank's net worth declines.
The pre-crisis overvaluation of bank and borrower assets is supported both by the disinformational accounting statements that troubled banks release and by the false assurances that incentive-conflicted regulators issue to back these statements up.
Government guarantees of the liabilities of an undercapitalized (i.e., overleveraged) bank curtail its depositors' incentive to test the reported value of bank assets unless and until the government's ability to support its guarantees comes rationally into doubt. This doubt surfaces in the form of silent runs. Such runs pass into open crisis if and when the bureaucratic machinery for supporting depositor guarantees seizes up.
Silent runs are rooted in rational (rather than irrational) doubts about the net worth of the combined financial resources that the banks and the government can command. While injections of liquidity from foreign and multinational lending can finance a prolongation of the silent run, the doubts driving the run can only be permanently silenced by injections of sufficient additional equity either into the banks or into the guarantee support mechanism.
In the face of an open crisis, the effects on the distribution of national income of alternative strategies for managing the crisis come to the forefront. Projected income-redistribution effects can easily turn into political dynamite because taxpayers can see the costs and benefits of alternative banking policies more clearly when banks are under strain. The precrisis level of subsidies to banks and politically favored borrowers cannot be maintained unless these sectors are willing and able to exert increased pressure on the government. Other things equal, a government is more likely to labor to keep zombie banks and zombie borrowers in business: the shorter is its decisionmaking horizon, the more corruptible are its policymaking processes, and the greater is its access to temporary increases in liquidity from IMF and World Bank loans.
Although the globalization of financial markets increases the frequency and breadth of crises, it decreases their severity. This means that each new or recurring banking crisis encountered in Africa delivers some obvious bad news and some lessobvious good news about banking and real investment on the continent. The bad news is to inform us more fully about size of the damage that banking misregulation has done in the past. The good news is that the era of blatantly exploitive national banking systems is being brought to an end. The footholds that foreign banks are establishing with African depositors are generating pressure for better regulation in the future.
Our misregulation model of crisis frames the suffering that repressed financial crises have visited on African economies as vehicles for communicating an expensive lesson about the hidden costs that taxpayers pay for tolerating inappropriate regulation. When the bill for misregulation is finally presented, taxpayers and depositors will shrink the domain of regulatory systems that prove themselves to be inefficient, inequitable, or corrupt. Replacing discredited financial systems and officials with more-efficient systems and better-disciplined regulators promises to promote healthier banks and to shape a flow of more productive real investment. In the less-autarkic financial environment that is beginning to emerge in Africa, domestic savings will be more reliably rewarded and will flow to socially more valuable uses.
Prospects," draft. 
Significant
Fifty percent of loans were nonperforming and were taken over by the treasury; operations covered all the 5 commercial banks, and were followed by ongoing structural reforms.
Angola (Cabinda) (1991-)
The two-tier banking system (established in 1991) was still not consolidated in 1996; 2 commercial banks (state-owned) were experiencing solvency problems. Crisis All three commercial banks collapsed; 78% of loans were nonperforming at the end of 1988. CK (Caprio & Klingebiel, 1996b ) estimate losses to be 17% of GNP. Significant One problem bank was merged in 1994, a small bank was liquidated in 1995, and the state-owned National Development Bank was recapitalized at a cost of 0.6% of GDP. Significant Thirty-four percent of loans were nonperforming. (1994-) Significant Twenty-five percent of loans were nonperforming in 1995; one bank was liquidated. Crisis In 1989, 60-70% of loans were nonperforming.
Benin

Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
(1995-) Crisis About 30% of loans were nonperforming. (1993-) Significant In September 1993, the central bank was separated from the principal commercial bank. An estimated 30% of loans of the commercial bank were nonperforming at the end of 1995. This is in addition to nonperforming loans of public enterprises amounting to about 7% of GDP that remained with the central bank and were transferred to the government in September 1994. Crisis Four banks were liquidated.
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
(1995) Significant Forty percent of loans were nonperforming; one state-owned bank was being taken over by a private group. Crisis Full banking operations were resumed after the 1979 civil war, with a moratorium on some loans and deposits.
Chad
(1992) Significant Thirty-five percent of loans to the private sector were nonperforming. The central bank consolidated those loans held by the 3 main commercial banks.
Comoros
...
Congo, Republic of
Crisis Seventy-five percent of loans to the private sector were nonperforming; 2 state-owned banks were being liquidated and 2 other state-owned banks were being privatized. Significant Five specialized financial institutions and one commercial bank were restructured. Nonperforming loans reached 12% of bank credit. Central bank loans to the government helped reduce its arrears to the banks. CK estimate government costs at 25% of GDP. Significant Two of 6 commercial banks ceased operations in 1991 and 1992; another bank experienced difficulties. Significant Four main public sector banks were given capital assistance. Crisis Two of the country's largest banks were liquidated.
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Significant
The principal bank's main shareholder has been placed in liquidation. (1994) Significant State-owned banks were undercapitalized, but information on the quality of bank portfolios is scarce. Significant A government-owned bank was restructured, and its nonperforming loans were taken over by the government. (1995-) Significant Nine percent of loans were nonperforming; one bank was temporarily closed in 1995. Significant Ten percent of bank credit was nonperforming in 1992. A government bank was restructured and privatized in 1992. Significant Forty percent of bank credit to nongovernment borrowers was nonperforming in 1989; one bank was closed and two were merged. CK estimate restructuring costs to be 6% of GNP. Crisis The state-owned banking system collapsed; 80% of loans were nonperforming. CK estimate payments to depositors cost 3% of GNP. (ongoing 1996) Significant After transition to a system in which the central bank and private commercial banks operate separately; sizeable nonperforming loans (equivalent to 3.5% of GDP) were assumed by the treasury in early 1996.
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
(1988-) Significant In August 1995, 26% of loans were nonperforming. Significant 4 banks and 24 nonbank financial institutions with 15% of system liabilities faced liquidity and solvency problems.
Kenya
(1993) Significant About 66% of loans of one third of the commercial banks were nonperforming. The local subsidiary of Meridien BIAO was closed in 1995 with little spillover. (1988-) Significant Of 4 commercial banks, 1 that serves mostly the agricultural sector and has only a small share of bank assets has had a large portfolio of nonperforming loans. Banking services were disrupted for two months in 1991 owing to a strike. Crisis Seven out of 11 banks are not operational; their assets were equivalent to 60% of total bank assets at mid-1995.
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Significant Five major banks had nonperforming loans ranging from 45% to 75% of their portfolio.
(1991-95) Significant There were severe management problems in the 2 remaining stateowned banks. Loan losses resulted in reserve deficiencies and the need for substantial provisions in 1994.
Malawi
... Significant The largest bank was nearly illiquid, with 75% of its loans nonperforming; it was restructured in 1989 with equity injection and government loan guarantees.
Mali
(1995) Significant The government made an "equity" loan to strengthen the capital of one bank following the collapse of Meridien Bank. Significant The Development Bank ceased operations and was liquidated in 1994; 3 of the 4 commercial banks required substantial recapitalization. CK estimate rehabilitation costs to be 15% of GDP in 1988.
Mauritania
Morocco
... Sources: Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), pp. 20-35; Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) . An ellipsis (…) indicates that these sources supply no information about banking problems in this particular country. Shares of the bank have been divided up between private investors, government and the IFC. Basic features of implicit deposit insurance system: (1) Absence of written law such that legal obligation is absent, (2) Absence of laid dow coverage limits and form compensation. Funding by the government is discretionary, (3) Absence of earmarked funds for assistance.
Mozambique
Basic features of explicit deposit insurance: Legislation, by constitution, central bank law or banking law, requiring establishment of guaran statute specifies type of institutions and deposits covered, coverage limits, management and membership, funding arrangements and proced failures. 
Number of Countries in Crisis
Number of Countries Sources: Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) . Duration (years)
Number of Countries Crises Problems
Sources: Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) . 
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Sources: Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996); Caprio and Klingebiel (1996b) ; and the Transparency International 1998 Corruption Index
